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STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NEW YORK STATE PAROLE OFFICERS 
BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5441 
STATE OF NEW YORK (DIVISION OF PAROLE), 
Employer, 
-and-
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES FEDERATION, AFL-CIO, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
BARTLO, HETTLER & WEISS (CHARLES J. NAUGHTON, of counsel) 
for Petitioner 
WALTER J. PELLEGRINI, GENERAL COUNSEL (JAMES D. TAYLOR of 
counsel) for Employer 
WILLIAM P. SEAMON, ESQ., GENERAL COUNSEL (STEVEN M. KLEIN of 
counsel) for Intervenor 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions, dated April 2, 2007, filed by the New York 
State Parole Officers Benevolent Association (Association). The Association seeks 
review of an interim decision by the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), dated February 12, 
2007, concluding that the at-issue Parole Officer titles in the State of New York (Division 
Case No. C-5441 -2 
of Parole) (State) should not be removed from the bargaining unit of professional, 
scientific, and technical employees represented by the Public Employees Federation, 
AFL-CIO (PEF) based on their law enforcement duties. PEF has filed a response in 
opposition to the exceptions, dated May 25, 2007. The State has not filed a response to 
the Association's exceptions. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
On August 9, 2004, the Association filed a representation petition seeking to 
represent a bargaining unit composed of approximately 1,200 employees of the State 
holding titles in the Parole Officer series. Among the three bases for the petition is the 
Association's claim that the law enforcement duties of the Parole Officer titles 
necessitate their removal from the professional, scientific, and technical unit 
represented by PEF premised on Board precedent holding that employees performing 
criminal law enforcement duties are entitled to a separate bargaining unit from 
employees who do not perform such duties.1 In the alternative, the Association's petition 
seeks fragmentation for the at-issue titles under the standards set forth in Town of 
Southampton2 or Icahbod Crane Central School District.3 
Both the State and PEF filed responses to the Association's petition. 
1
 See, County of Erie and Sheriff of Erie County, 29 PERB1J3031 (1996), confirmed sub 
nom., County of Erie v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 247 AD2d 671, 31 PERB 
1J7004 (3d Dept 1998); County of Rockland, 32 PERB 1J3074 (1999), confirmed sub 
nom., United Federation of Police Officers v County of Rockland, et al., 34 PERB 1J7019 
(Sup Ct Albany County 2001). 
2
 37 PERB 1J3001 (2004). 
3
 33 PERB U3042 (2000), confirmed sub nom.; CSEA v New York State Pub Empl Rel 
Bd, 300 AD2d 929, 35 PERB 1J7020 (3d Dept 2002). 
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Prior to commencing the investigatory hearing, the ALJ determined that the most 
efficient means of processing the representation petition would be through the 
bifurcation of the articulated bases for the Association's petition and focused initially on 
the issue of whether the titles should be fragmented based on their alleged law 
enforcement duties. Five days of hearing were held relating to this sole issue. 
On February 12, 2007, the ALJ issued an interim decision concluding that 
criminal law enforcement is not the primary or exclusive duty of the employees holding 
the at-issue titles.4 The Association has filed exceptions with the Board and PEF has 
responded to those exceptions. The State has not filed a response to the Association's 
exceptions. 
DISCUSSION 
The Association asserts a purported right to file exceptions without permission 
based on our decision in State of New York,5 wherein the Board accepted and decided 
exceptions from an ALJ's interim decision in a representation case without the party 
making a motion for leave pursuant to §212.4(g) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). 
Historically, the Board has granted leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-
final rulings and decisions in situations where the moving party can demonstrate 
440PERB 1J4003 (2007). 
5
 39 PERB 1J3032 (2006). 
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extraordinary circumstances.6 Although perhaps an inexact standard, application of the 
extraordinary circumstances standard has resulted in the rejection of most requests for 
permission to file exceptions, especially regarding interim decisions and rulings in 
improper practice cases.7 In the vast majority of such cases, we have recognized that it 
is far more efficient for the Board and the parties to await a final disposition by the ALJ 
or the Director of Public Employment Practices and Representation (Director) before 
examining interim determinations. 
In contrast, we have been far more willing to grant leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions in representation cases under the extraordinary circumstances standard, 
when the issue raised in the motion for leave has important statewide policy or legal 
implications for the processing of future representation petitions, may help insure 
procedural certainty in such processing or where our decision may obviate the need for 
further processing of the petition.8 
The State of New York9 decision relied upon by the Association constituted a 
departure from a long series of decisions requiring a party to request permission to file 
6
 Buffalo Municipal Housing Auth, 35 PERB1J3009 (2002); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB 
1J3031 (2000); Council 82 AFSCME, 32 PERB 1J3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch Dist, 
32 PERB 1J3022 (1999); New York State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB 1J3022 
(1997;; Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free 
Sch Dist, 28 PERB 1J3034 (1995); Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993). 
7
 Town of Shawangunk, supra, note 6. 
8
 Town ofRamapo, 40 PERB ^3006 (June 27, 2007); Buffalo Municipal Housing Auth, 
supra, note 6; State of New York (NYSCOPBA), 31 PERB P058 (1998); County of 
Putnam, 31 PERB P031 (1998); State of New York (Div of Military and Naval Affairs), 
18 PERB P084 (1985). 
9
 Supra, note 5. 
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^ exceptions for interlocutory review of interim decisions and rulings pursuant to §212.4(h) 
of the Rules. Although we agree that the "ultimate issue" raised and determined in State 
of New York would have constituted a valid basis for the grant of permission to file 
exceptions, to the extent the case established a basis for filing exceptions to interim 
decisions and rulings without permission, it is hereby overruled. 
In the present case, the ALJ's interim decision regarding whether fragmentation 
of the Parole Officers was appropriate based on their law enforcement duties is subject 
to §212.4(h) of the Rules which states, in relevant part, that: "All motions and rulings 
made at the hearing shall be part of the record of the proceeding, and unless expressly 
authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to the board, but shall be 
considered by the board whenever the case is submitted to it for decision." (emphasis 
added). Therefore, we must determine whether the Association should be granted 
permission to file exceptions pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules. 
We note that §212.4(h) of the Rules does not identify the precise procedural 
vehicle for requesting interlocutory review. The appropriate method for seeking leave to 
file exceptions is through a written motion, on notice to all parties, setting forth the 
relevant facts, the issues to be determined and the reason why interlocutory relief 
should be granted. In the present case, the Association's exceptions will be treated as a 
motion for relief pursuant to §212.4(h).10 
Upon a review of the ALJ's decision, the Association's exceptions and PEF's 
response, we are persuaded that extraordinary circumstances exist in this 
10
 State of New York (Unified Court System), 36 PERB ^3031 (2003). 
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representation case for the grant of leave to file exceptions. A decision with respect to 
the law enforcement duty standard for fragmentation in the present case may obviate 
the need for further hearings and may help clarify the applicability of that standard to 
non-police job titles throughout New York State. 
The State shall have seven working days after receipt of this decision to either 
file a response to the Association's exceptions pursuant to the requirements in §213.3 
of the Rules or notify the Board in writing that it will not be filing a response. 
DATED: June 27, 2007 
Albany, New York A 
Jerome Lefkqwitz, Chairman 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
RAMAPO POLICE SUPERIOR OFFICER'S 
ASSOCIATION, 
Petitioner, 
- and - CASE NO. C-5604 
TOWN OF RAMAPO, 
Employer, 
-and-
RAMAPO POLICE BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION, 
Incumbent/lntervenor. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Petitioner 
MICHAEL KLEIN, ESQ., TOWN ATTORNEY (JACK SCHLOSS, ESQ., 
of counsel), for Employer 
INTERIM BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to us on exceptions, dated January 16, 2007, filed by the 
Ramapo Police Superior Officer's Association (Association). In the alternative, the 
Association seeks leave to file exceptions pursuant to §212.4(g) of PERB's Rules of 
Procedure (Rules). 
The Association seeks review of an interim ruling by the Director of Public 
Employment Practices and Representation (Director), dated December 21, 2006, 
denying a motion by the Association for certification without an election pursuant to 
Case No. C-5604 -2-
§201.9(g)(1) of the Rules. The Town of Ramapo (Town) has not filed a response to the 
Association's exceptions and/or its application for leave to file exceptions.1 
FACTS 
On May 22, 2006, the Association filed a representation petition seeking to 
represent a bargaining unit composed of seven (7) Lieutenants employed by the Town. 
The Lieutenant title is within a bargaining unit represented by the Ramapo Police 
Benevolent Association (PBA). The PBA did not file a response to the petition and 
informed the Administrative Law Judge (ALJ), through counsel, that it consented to the 
proposed fragmentation and would not be participating in any further proceedings. 
At the July 20, 2006 conference before the ALJ, the Town consented to the 
proposed fragmentation of the Lieutenants from the PBA bargaining unit, but averred 
that three individuals holding the title are not public employees pursuant to §201.7(a) of 
the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act) because they are managerial and 
should be excluded from the new unit. 
On October 10, 2006, a hearing commenced pursuant to §212.4 of the Rules 
before the ALJ on the question whether the three Lieutenants should be excluded from 
the unit because they are managerial. At the hearing, the Association requested that 
the Director recommend to the Board that the Association be certified without an 
election, pursuant to §201.9(g)(1) of the Rules.2 On October 23, 2006, the Association 
filed a letter motion with the Director requesting certification without an election prior to 
1
 Pursuant to §212.4(g) of the Rules, the grant or denial of a motion for interlocutory 
appeal remains at the sole discretion of the Board regardless of whether the non-
moving party has filed a response to the motion. 
2
 Transcript, pp. 32-36. 
Case No. C-5604 -3-
a determination being reached on whether the three at-issue Lieutenants are 
managerial pursuant to §201.7(a) of the Act. 
On November 9, 2006, the hearing before the ALJ continued. On November 28, 
2006, the Town filed a letter with the Director opposing the Association's motion for 
certification without an election. 
On December 21, 2006, the Director issued an interim ruling denying the 
Association's motion for a certification without an election prior to a determination 
concerning the three Lieutenants' alleged managerial status. In his interim decision, the 
Director concluded that PERB's historical administrative practice of determining 
managerial and/or confidential status in the context of the uniting criteria set forth in 
§207.1 of the Act is fully consistent with both the Act and Rules. Following issuance of 
the Director's decision, the hearing before the ALJ continued on February 20, 2007 and 
June 14, 2007. 
DISCUSSION 
Historically, the Board has granted leave to file interlocutory exceptions to non-
final rulings and decisions in situations where the moving party can demonstrate 
extraordinary circumstances.3 In the present case, the Director's interim decision 
denying the motion made by the Association during the pendency of the hearing is 
subject to §212.4(h) of the Rules, which states, in relevant part: "All motions and rulings 
made at the hearing shall be part of the record of the proceeding, and unless expressly 
3
 Buffalo Municipal Housing Auth, 35 PERB 1J3009 (2002); City of Newburgh, 33 PERB 
1J3031 (2000); Council 82 AFSCME, 32 PERB fl3040 (1999); Watertown City Sch Dist, 
32 PERB 1J3022 (1999); New York State Housing Finance Agency, 30 PERB P022 
(1997;; Town of Shawangunk, 29 PERB 1J3050 (1996); Greenburgh No 11 Union Free 
Sch Dist, 28 PERB P034 (1995); Mt Morris Cent Sch Dist, 26 PERB 1J3085 (1993). 
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authorized by the board, shall not be appealed directly to the board, but shall be 
considered by the board whenever the case is submitted to it for decision." (emphasis 
added). Therefore, we must determine whether the Association has demonstrated 
extraordinary circumstances warranting the grant of permission to file exceptions 
pursuant to §212.4(h) of the Rules. 
The Association argues that the Board should grant it leave to file interlocutory 
exceptions on the ground that it seeks to raise important statutory and policy issues 
before the Board relating to the interplay between §§207.1 and 201.7(a) of the Act. 
Specifically, the Association requests that the Board determine whether certification of 
an employee organization with proof of majority status should be issued by the Director 
even when a dispute remains subjudice on the question of whether one or more 
individuals is a managerial employee pursuant to §207.1 of the Act. 
We are persuaded that extraordinary circumstances exist warranting the grant of 
leave to the Association to pursue exceptions because of the important statewide policy 
implications of the Association's argument as it relates to the handling of managerial 
and/or confidential issues in the processing of future representation petitions and to 
insure procedural certainty in such processing.4 Based on our decision to grant the 
Association leave to file exceptions, we do not reach the Association's assertion that it 
4
 Although §212.4(h) of the Rules does not identify the precise procedural vehicle for 
requesting interlocutory review, the appropriate method is for the party requesting such 
review to file a written motion, on notice to the other party, setting forth the relevant 
facts, the issues to be determined and the reason why interlocutory relief should be 
granted. See, State of New York (Div of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (June 27, 2007) In 
the present case, the Association's exceptions will be treated as a motion for relief 
pursuant to §212.4(h). See, e.g., State of New York - Unified Court System, 36 PERB 
P031 (2003). 
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had a right to file exceptions to the Director's interim ruling pursuant to §213.2 of the 
Rules.5 
The Town shall have seven working days after receipt of this decision to file a 
response to the Association's exceptions or file cross-exceptions consistent with the 
provisions of §213.3 of the Rules. Thereafter, the Association may file a response to 
any cross-exceptions filed by the Town within seven working days after of such cross-
exceptions. 
DATED: June 27, 2007 
Albany, New York 
/jAiMU_s-
Jerome Lefkowijz, Chairman 
iu^ ^rJ£fc^ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
5
 The Association asserts such a right based on the decision in State of New York, 39 
PERB H3032 (2006) wherein the Board concluded that a party had a right to file 
exceptions to an ALJ's interim decision in a representation case because the interim 
decision reached an "ultimate issue." The Board in State of New York, supra, did not 
articulate any test for distinguishing an "ultimate issue" from an "intermediate" one and 
overlooked relevant earlier precedent regarding the applicable standards under the 
Rules. See, Buffalo Municipal Housing Auth, supra, City of Newburgh, supra, Town of 
Shawangunk, supra. Based on the inconsistency of the State of New York decision 
with our Rule and precedent, it has been overruled by our decision issued today in State 
of New York (Division of Parole), 40 PERB 1J3007 (June 27, 2007). 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
ORANGETOWN POLICEMEN'S BENEVOLENT 
ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
-and- CASE NO. U-25717 
TOWN OF ORANGETOWN, 
Respondent. 
BUNYAN & BAUMGARTNER, LLP (JOSEPH P. BAUMGARTNER of 
counsel), for Charging Party 
KEANE & BEANE, P.C. (LANCE H. KLEIN of counsel), for Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on a single exception filed by the Town of 
Orangetown (Town) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that 
the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). 
An improper practice charge had been filed by the Orangetown Policemen's 
Benevolent Association (PBA) alleging a violation of §209-a.1(d) of the Act when the 
Town informed police officers and the PBA that they had no right to video or audio 
tape medical examinations conducted to determine eligibility for benefits for line-of-
duty injuries under General Municipal Law (GML) §207-c. 
EXCEPTIONS 
The Town's sole exception to the ALJ's decision is limited to its contention 
that prior precedent interpreting GML §207-c and the Act establish that it was not 
Case No. U-25717 -2-
obligated to negotiate with respect to the video or audio taping of a GML §207-c 
medical examination. The PBA's response supports the ALJ's decision. 
Based upon our review of the record and consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we affirm the decision of the ALJ. 
FACTS 
The facts are fully set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only 
as necessary to address the exceptions.1 The case was decided on a stipulated 
record submitted and agreed to by the parties at the hearing. 
In December 2004, Police Officer John Fitzgibbons, having filed a claim 
for GML §207-c benefits for a line-of-duty injury, was directed by Chief of Police 
Kevin A. Nulty to undergo a medical examination by the Town's designated 
physician. Fitzgibbons went to the scheduled examination accompanied by a 
PBA representative. The physician was then informed by Fitzgibbons that it was 
his intent to have the PBA representative video tape the examination. The 
physician refused to conduct the examination under those circumstances and 
gave Fitzgibbons a note stating: "the examination was not performed because 
the officer with the accompanying PBA representative placed requirements on 
the examination which were deemed unacceptable." Thereafter, Nulty informed 
Fitzgibbons that an examinee did not have the right to video tape the physical 
examination under GML §207-c. 
Police Officer Susan Lanoce received a letter, dated January 26, 2005, 
from Nulty directing her to undergo a medical examination regarding a GML 
§207-c claim she had filed. In the letter, Nulty stated that an examinee did not 
have the right to video tape the Town's examination. Upon appearing for the 
139PERBfl4611 (2006). 
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medical examination, Lanoce informed the physician that she intended to audio 
tape the examination. When the physician refused to allow the examination to be 
audio taped, Lanoce left. Thereafter, the examination was rescheduled by the 
Town and Lanoce was given a written notification "that there is to be no video or 
audio-taping of the Town's examination." 
On February 7, 2005, Nulty sent a letter to PBA President Dennis Buckley, 
stating that there was to be no video or audio taping at GML §207-c medical 
examinations. Prior to this letter, the Town had no written policy about video or 
audio taping GML §207-c medical examinations conducted by the Town's 
designated physician. In addition, neither the PBA nor any officer had ever 
requested, or attempted, to video or audio tape a GML §207-c medical 
examination prior to Fitzgibbons' attempt in December 2004. Neither party 
sought to negotiate the subject prior to the filing of the improper practice charge. 
PROCEDURAL MATTERS 
Following a review of the exceptions and response, the Board sent a letter, 
dated May 18, 2007, inviting the parties to present oral argument on June 6, 2007 
to address the following issues: a) was the Town's action a unilateral change in the 
GML §207-c procedure or was it the PBA that was seeking to alter the procedure; 
and b) is a unilateral change a necessary element of the §209-a.1(d) violation 
alleged by the PBA. 
During oral argument, the Town contended that its actions had been an 
attempt to maintain the status quo and that it was the PBA which attempted to 
make a unilateral change in the procedure without negotiations because there was 
no past practice of video or audio taping of GML §207-c medical examinations. 
Case No. U-25717 -4-
Therefore, the Town asserted that it was the PBA that had violated the Act by 
attempting to unilaterally change a past practice without negotiations. 
In response, the PBA contended during oral argument that the Town had 
waived its ability to raise the argument about the lack of a past practice of audio or 
video recording of GML §207-c medical examinations or assert that the PBA failed 
to demand negotiations on the subject. In support of its waiver argument the PBA 
cited §213.2(b)(4) of PERB's Rules of Procedure (Rules). Further, the PBA 
asserted that an employee organization is incapable of making a unilateral change 
in violation of the Act because it is public employers, not employee organizations, 
that have control over terms and conditions of employment. 
DISCUSSION 
We first address the issues, raised in our letter to the parties, that were the 
subject of oral argument. 
Initially, we note that the Board has never held that an employee organization 
violated its duty to negotiate in good faith in violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act by 
unilaterally altering a term and condition of employment. In contrast, the National 
Labor Relations Board has found labor organizations to have violated §8(b)(3) of the 
National Labor Relations Act when they unilaterally change a term or condition of 
employment.2 
2
 Communication Workers Local 1170 (Rochester Telephone), 194 NLRB 872 
(1972), enfd 474 F2d 778 (2d Cir 1972); Painters New York District Council 9 
(Westgate Painting), 186 NLRB 964 (1970), enfd 453 F2d 783 (2d Cir 1971), cert 
denied 408 US 930 (1972). Based on the distinctions between the Act and the 
National Labor Relations Act, we take no position regarding whether this federal 
precedent is instructive or persuasive for purposes of interpreting the Act. See, 
New York City Transit Auth v New York State Pub Empl Rel Bd, 8 NY3d 226, 40 
PERB U 7001 (2007); Thousand Islands Cent Sch Dist, 11 PERB 3025(1978). 
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In the present case, we are constrained by our Rules from reaching the 
question of whether the PBA unilaterally changed the past practice and, therefore, 
was required to seek to negotiate the issue of video or audio taping of the medical 
examination because this issue was waived by the Town when it failed to include it 
in its exceptions. 
Section 213.2(b) of the Rules state: 
(b) The exceptions shall: 
(1) set forth specifically the questions or policy to 
which exceptions are taken; 
(2) identify that part of the decision, report, order, 
ruling or other findings or determinations to which 
exceptions are taken; 
(3) designate by page citation the portions of 
the record relied upon; and 
(4) state the grounds for exceptions. An exception 
which is not specifically urged is waived, (emphasis added) 
As noted, the Town's sole exception is limited to its argument that GML 
§207-c renders the issue of video or audio taping the medical examination a 
prohibited subject of bargaining because "initial eligibility determinations for 
Section 207-c benefits lie within the employer's exclusive authority...." 
Furthermore, we are unable to reach the question of whether the PBA violated 
the Act by attempting to video and audio tape the initial medical examination, thereby 
changing the GML §207-c procedure, because the Town did not file an improper 
practice charge against the PBA alleging a violation of §209-a.2(b) of the Act.3 
Instead, the Town asserted in its answer, as its fourth affirmative defense 
to the charge: "The PBA never negotiated the right to video or audio tape 
3
 Under the Rules, it is well established that the Board cannot adjudicate a 
counterclaim to an improper practice charge. Albany Prof Perm Firefighters 
Assn, 4 PERB fl3071, at 3729 (1971). 
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conducted medical examinations."4 Nevertheless, like its exceptions, the Town's 
post-hearing memorandum of law to the ALJ focused exclusively on its statutory 
argument under GML §207-c and did not touch upon the Town's fourth 
affirmative defense. 
Because of the failure of the Town to file an exception contending that the 
PBA was the party that unilaterally altered the past practice and failed to seek 
negotiations, that question has not been preserved for Board review.5 
Furthermore, the Town failed to except to the ALJ's ruling that Nulty's 
February 7, 2005 letter specifying that "there will be no video or audio taping of 
the Town's GML 207-c examinations" was a unilateral change in then existing 
GML §207-c procedure. It was stipulated between the parties that the February 
7, 2005 letter constituted the first written policy regarding video taping and audio 
taping of GML §207-c physical examinations.6 
Based on the Town's failure to file an exception on the issue, the Board 
affirms the ALJ's conclusion that that the prohibition against video and audio 
taping of the GML§207-c examination set forth in Nulty's February 7, 2005 letter 
constitutes a unilateral change of a past practice. 
Finally, due to the narrowness of the Town's exception, the Board need 
not determine in this case the broader issue regarding whether and to what 
4
 ALJ Exhibit 2, ffl3. 
5
 Rules, §213.2(b)(4). See also, State of New York (OMH), 31 PERB1J3051 
(1998); NYCTA, 35 PERB 1J3028 (2002). A different outcome in this case would 
have resulted if the Board had not been precluded by the strict language of this 
Rule from re-examining this issue. The Board cannot reach this issue on its own 
motion. See Rules, §213.6(b). 
6
 Transcript, p. 10. 
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extent the intrusiveness of overt or covert audio or video taping outside or inside 
the workplace renders it a mandatory subject of bargaining.7 
In light of the Town's sole exception, the only issue before us is whether the 
scope of negotiable procedures under GML §207-c, as interpreted by relevant 
case law, includes the video or audio taping of a medical examination. The ALJ 
found that was negotiable and we hereby affirm that finding. 
It is well-settled that pursuant to GML §207-c, a municipality is granted the 
authority to make an initial eligibility determination about an officer's entitlement 
to the benefit.8 Various subjects that are part of the municipality's initial 
determination under GML §207-c are not negotiable, such as the waiver of 
confidentiality by the employee for the release of medical records relevant to the 
injury or illness for which the employee seeks GML §207-c benefits.9 In contrast, 
an employer's demand for an overbroad confidentiality waiver relating to a GML 
7
 Compare, Colgate-Palmolive Co, 323 NLRB 515, 155 LRRM 1034 (1997) 
(holding that a private employer had a statutory duty under the National Labor 
Relations Act to engage in collective bargaining over the installation and continued 
use of surveillance cameras); Niagara Frontier Transit Metro System, Inc., 36 
PERB j[3036 (2003)(holding that a public employer had a duty to negotiate the 
impact of the decision to use video footage obtained from surveillance cameras on 
buses in disciplinary proceedings). See also, Elmont Union Free Sch Dist, 28 
PERB H4693 (1995;; City of Syracuse, 14 PERB 1J4645 (1981); Labor Law §203-c 
(statutory prohibition against employer video taping of employees in rest rooms, 
locker rooms and other rooms designated by the employer for employees to 
change their clothing.) 
8
 DePoalo v County of Schenectady, 85 NY2d 527 (1995). 
9
 City of Schenectady, 25 PERB H3022 (1992), affd, Schenectady Police 
Benevolent Assn v New York State Pub Empl Relations Board, 85 NY2d 480, 28 
PERB H7005(1995). 
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§207-c examination is negotiable.10 Other procedural aspects of the initial 
determination have also been found to be mandatory subjects of negotiations.11 
It is incumbent upon the municipality when unilaterally adopting a policy or 
procedure beyond the statutory language of GML §207-c to establish that its 
action is merely the codification of existing practice or policy. Absent such proof, 
as is the case here, an employer's unilateral implementation of GML §207-c 
procedures is mandatorily negotiable.12 
The Board has characterized the receipt of GML §207-c benefits as akin 
to wages and, therefore, mandatorily negotiable: 
...as GML §207-c benefits are a form of wages, procedures which 
condition, restrict or potentially deny an employee's receipt of those 
benefits are terms and conditions of employment within the 
meaning of the Act, which must be negotiated before they are 
adopted or implemented except as negotiations are preempted by 
law or public policy.13 
In doing so, the Board has rejected arguments that GML §207-c generally 
preempts any duty to bargain over the procedures by which the statutorily 
mandated payments of wages and health care expenses are made. In Village of 
Hamburg,™ we held that "[t]he duty to bargain over GML §207-c is not limited 
1U
 Supra. 
11
 See Police Association of New Rochelle, New York, Inc., 13 PERB1J3082 
(1980); Local 589, International Association of Firefighters, AFL-CIO v City of 
Newburgh, 17 PERB j|7506 (Sup Ct Orange County 1984). 
12
 Town of Cortlandt, 30 PERB 1J3031 (1997), confirmed sub nom. Town of 
Cortlandt v Pub Empl Rel Bd, 30 PERB 1J7012 (Sup Ct Westchester County 
1997). 
13
 Id. at 3077. 
14
 36 PERB 1J3030, at 3088 (2003). 
Case No. U-25717 -9-
solely to procedures for the review of light-duty assignments or procedures for the 
termination of benefits." The Board's holding in V/7/age of Hamburg, supra, quoted 
language from the decision of the Court of Appeals in City of Watertown}5 that 
"matters related to section 207-c, but not specifically covered by the statute, are 
mandatory subjects of bargaining."16 In the City of Watertown, supra, the Court 
upheld our determination that a demand for arbitration of disputes involving 
eligibility for benefits under GML §207-c was a mandatory subject of negotiations. 
Based on the exception filed in this case, the Board affirms the ALJ's 
conclusion that the video or audio taping of the medical examination under GML 
§207-c is a mandatory subject of bargaining not only because it is a procedure for 
accumulating evidence to be utilized by the PBA and employee in the review of the 
initial determination, but also because such a procedure for making the initial 
determination is not precluded from negotiations by the specific statutory language 
of GML §207-c. 
Finally, the Board rejects the Town's reliance on the Court of Appeals' 
decision in Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters' Association v New York 
State Public Employment Relations Board}7 In that decision, the Court 
confirmed our decision18 that the demand for a particular de novo review 
procedure regarding an employee's claim under GML §207-a, rather than an 
15
 30 PERB H3072 (1997), confirmed, City of Watertown v New York State Pub 
Empl Rel Board, 31 PERB 1J7013 (Sup Ct Albany County 1998), revd, 263 AD2d 
797, 32 PERB fl7016 (3d Dept 1999), motion for leave to appeal granted, 94 
NY2d 751 33 PERB 1J7003 (1999), revd, 95 NY2d 73, 33 PERB 1J7007, at 7016 
(2000). 
16
 Id. at 7016. 
17
 6 NY3d 514, 39 PERB 1J7005 (2006). 
18
 36 PERB H3014 (2003). 
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employer's initial eligibility determination, was a nonmandatory subject of 
negotiations. The Court's decision in Poughkeepsie Professional Firefighters' 
Association, supra, cannot be reasonably construed as prohibiting negotiations 
regarding a blanket prohibition against a procedure for accumulating evidence to 
be utilized in a procedure for challenging the employer's initial determination 
under GML §207-c. 
Based on the foregoing, we deny the Town's exception and affirm the 
decision of ALJ. 
The Board, therefore, finds that the Town violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act 
when it unilaterally prohibited video or audio taping of the medical examination 
conducted as part of the initial determination of eligibility for GML §207-c benefits. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that 
1. The Town immediately rescind its prohibition against video or audio 
taping of GML §207-c medical examinations; 
2. Remove from unit members' personnel files any documents placed in 
those files as a result of the implementation of the prohibition; and 
3. Sign and post the attached notice in all locations customarily used to 
communicate with employees in the unit represented by the PBA. 
DATED: June 27, 2007 
Albany, New York 
/ , 
Jerome Le^owitz.Cj'fairman 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
NOTICE TO ALL 
EMPLOYEES 
PURSUANT TO 
THE DECISION AND ORDER OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
and in order to effectuate the policies of the 
NEW YORK STATE 
PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' FAIR EMPLOYMENT ACT 
we hereby notify all employees of the Town of Orangetown represented by the 
Orangetown Policemen's Benevolent Association that the Town of Orangetown will 
1. immediately rescind its prohibition against videotaping or 
audiotaping of GML §207-c medical examinations; and 
2. remove from unit members' personnel files any documents 
placed in those files as a result of the implementation of the 
prohibition. 
Dated By 
(Representative) (Title) 
Town of Orangetown 
This Notice must remain posted for 30 consecutive days from the date of posting, and must not be 
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
JOHNSON CITY POLICE ASSOCIATION, 
Charging Party, 
CASENO.U-26316 
- and -
VILLAGE OF JOHNSON CITY, 
Respondent. 
JOHN M. CROTTY, ESQ., for Charging Party 
COUGHLIN & GERHART, LLP (JOSEPH J. STEFLIK, JR. of counsel), for 
Respondent 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Village of Johnson City 
(Village) to a decision of an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) finding that the Village 
violated §209-a.1(d) of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act (Act). An improper 
practice charge had been filed by the Johnson City Police Association (Association), 
alleging that the Village had violated §209-a.1 (d) of the Act when it submitted to 
compulsory interest arbitration a bargaining proposal that had not previously been 
negotiated. 
The parties submitted the case to the ALJ on a stipulated record. Based upon the 
record and the parties' briefs, the ALJ found that the submission to interest arbitration of 
a demand that was characterized as "off the record and for settlement only" violated 
§209-a.1(d)oftheAct. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
) 
The Village excepts to the ALJ's decision, arguing that the ALJ erred by finding 
that the proposal at issue was "informal" and that the parties' negotiations were "off the 
record".1 The Association's response supports the ALJ's decision. 
Upon our review of the record and our consideration of the parties' arguments, 
we reverse and remand the decision to the ALJ for further development of the factual 
record. 
FACTS 
The facts are set forth in the ALJ's decision and are repeated here only as 
necessary to address the exceptions.2 
During collective negotiations for a successor agreement to the one that expired 
on May 31,2004, the Association proffered to the Village a drug and alcohol testing 
J , 
proposal, dated March 4, 2005, as part of a package of proposals that contained the 
following opening statement: 
This "Off the Record Offer of Settlement" is being made to 
the Village of Johnson City (Village) with the understanding 
and agreement by the Village that it is to be used by the 
parties to attempt a negotiated settlement and that it cannot 
1
 In its answer and exceptions, the Village asserts that the Association negotiated in bad 
faith in violation of §209-a(2)(b) of the Act by failing to include the drug and alcohol 
testing policy in the demands it submitted to interest arbitration and by refusing to 
acknowledge the Village's right to submit the proposal to interest arbitration. Based on 
the fact that the Village did not file an improper practice charge against the Association, 
the issue of whether the Association violated the Act is not before the Board nor was it 
before the ALJ. See, Albany Professional Permanent Firefighters Assn, 4 PERB j[3071, 
at 3729 (1971). 
2
 40 PERB 1J4509 (2007). 
3
 The expired collective bargaining agreement was silent on the subject of drug and 
alcohol testing. 
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release or use its contents in any other proceeding or forum 
(i.e., mediation, arbitration, etc.) without the express written 
consent of the Johnson City Police Association (PBA) 
President or designee. The purpose of the "Offer" is for the 
limited purposes of settlement. The PBA reserves the right 
to modify and/or withdraw its "Offer" at any time. 
On May 5, 2005, the Village responded via e-mail with an attachment containing 
the Village's revised proposals which stated, with respect to the Association's drug and 
alcohol proposal, that the "concept of [Association's] proposal is acceptable; language 
revisions are being prepared." In addition, the Village's revised proposals stated: "These 
proposals are made as a package. All other proposals are to be withdrawn."4 
Thereafter, the Village sent a letter, dated June 8, 2005,5 to the Association, stating 
that-
Pursuant to our agreement, the following constitutes the 
revised proposal of the Village....The purpose of this 
proposal is for settlement only. The Village reserves the right 
to modify and/or withdraw this proposal at any time. 
Article (Substance Abuse) - the [Association] proposal is 
generally acceptable; the Village is reviewing revisions to 
accommodate practical concerns. 
The same caveat and the same language with respect to "Substance Abuse" were 
reiterated by the Village in its June 20, 2005 letter to the Association.6 
There is no evidence in the stipulated record regarding the negotiations, if any, 
that ensued between the parties regarding the proposed drug and alcohol testing policy 
4
 Joint Exhibit 7. 
5
 Joint Exhibit 9. 
6
 Joint Exhibit 16 
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and procedure. The Association thereafter filed a declaration of impasse with PERB's 
Office of Conciliation. The record does not contain the declaration of impasse or 
evidence regarding whether the proposed drug and alcohol testing policy was discussed 
without condition between the parties during mediation. 
On September 20, 2005, the Association filed a petition for compulsory interest 
arbitration with PERB's Director of Conciliation.7 The petition contained no reference to 
a drug and alcohol testing policy. The Village filed a response to the petition dated 
October 4, 2005, attaching its May 5, 2005 revised proposals that included the proposal 
entitled: "Drug Testing - concept of [Association] proposal is acceptable; language 
revisions are being prepared."8 
The Association then filed the instant improper practice charge alleging that the 
Village violated §209-a.1(d) of the Act when it included in its response to the 
Association's petition a copy of the Village's revised proposals, e-mailed to the 
Association on May 5, 2005, that included the language "Drug Testing - concept of PBA 
proposal is acceptable; language revisions are being prepared." 
DISCUSSION 
In its second exception, the Village contends that although the Association had 
proposed the drug and alcohol testing policy "off the record," the Village had accepted 
the proposal "on the record", but that the Association refused to continue to negotiate 
regarding the proposal. 
7
 Joint Exhibit 13. 
8
 Joint Exhibit 14. 
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The Association's initial proposal regarding drug testing was contained in the 
Association's March 4, 2005, package of proposals clearly entitled "Off the Record Offer 
of Settlement." The Association's package of proposals contained additional language 
conditioning its use to settlement discussions and stating that it could not be utilized or 
offered into evidence in any other forum without the Association's consent. The Village's 
May 5, 2005 and June 8, 2005, responses to the drug and alcohol testing proposal 
accepted the "concept" of the Association's proposed drug and alcohol testing policy 
and stated that "language revisions (regarding the proposal) are being prepared." 
The stipulated record before the ALJ does not establish that the Village ever 
accepted the conditions placed by the Association that the drug and alcohol testing 
proposal was "off the record." It is noted that the Village's exceptions on the issue are 
ambiguous. The Village asserts in its exceptions that it accepted the Association's drug 
and alcohol testing proposal "on the record" but at the same time states that "virtually all 
of the proposals made by both the Village and Association were 'off the record'." 
In addition, the stipulated record does not contain the Association's declaration of 
impasse and the record is silent as to what, if anything, was discussed and agreed upon 
by the parties with respect to the "off the record" characterization of the Association's 
proposal or whether the parties discussed the language revisions mentioned in the 
Village's revised proposals. 
There have been two prior ALJ decisions that have concluded that the inclusion 
of an agreed upon "off the record" proposal in a declaration of impasse constituted an 
improper practice. In Police Benevolent Association of the City of White Plains,9 an 
9
 25 PERB1J4691 (1992). 
Case No. U-26316 -6-
employer's proposal was characterized by its negotiator as "off the record" and if not 
accepted by the parties, it would be as if it were never made. The hearing record 
established that the employee organization's representatives agreed to the approach 
and made their own "off the record" proposals in response. When the employee 
organization thereafter included the employer's "off the record" proposal in its 
declaration of impasse, the ALJ found the employee organization violated §209-a.2(b) 
of the Act by engaging in bad faith negotiations. Similarly, in Uniondale Administrators' 
Association,™ an ALJ found a violation when an employer's proposal entitled "District 
Off the Record Proposal Not to Be Revealed to Any Mediator or Fact-Finder Without 
District Agreement" was submitted to fact-finding. The ALJ in that case concluded that 
the introduction of an "off the record" proposal in fact-finding was the same as the 
submission of a proposal that had not been previously "negotiated", and was, likewise, 
improper.11 
We hereby adopt the rationale articulated by the ALJs in those two decisions. 
The Act encourages the parties to engage in "a free exchange of ideas and the 'give-
and-take' which marks good faith negotiations".12 An agreement between the parties to 
exchange "off the record" proposals, especially toward the end of collective negotiations 
and immediately prior to impasse, can be an important and effective tool in reaching a 
10
 20 PERB TJ4634(1987). 
11
 See, Schenectady County Comm Coll, 6 PERB H3027, affg 6 PERB1J4503 (1973). 
12
 County of Saratoga and Saratoga County Sheriff, 17 PERB 1J3033, at 3056 (1984), 
confirmed sub nom. County of Saratoga, New York and Saratoga County Sheriff v 
Newman and CSEA, 17 PERB 1J7010 (Sup Ct Saratoga County 1984). 
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final agreement. At the same time, a party cannot avoid its duty to negotiate in good 
faith by conditioning all of its proposals prior to impasse to be "off the record." 
Discussions regarding contract proposals that the parties have agreed to be "off 
the record" do not constitute negotiations under the Act. Therefore, such "off the record" 
or informal proposals may not be submitted to an arbitration panel as proposals that 
have been negotiated and are still "open" and in need of resolution.13 
In the present case, the stipulated record fails to shed sufficient light on what 
transpired during negotiations following the submission by the Association of the "off the 
record" proposal. In light of the limited nature of the stipulated record, we are unable to 
determine whether the "off the record" condition placed by the Association on its 
proposal was accepted by the Village and/or whether the treatment of the proposal by 
the parties was consistent with the Association's condition. Therefore, the matter must 
be remanded to the ALJ to develop a fuller record on this issue. 
Finally, the Village's proposal on drug and alcohol testing only refers to the 
Association's proposal, without incorporating the language of the proposed policy, and 
notes that it was subject to language revisions. Such a proposal may be too vague and 
incomplete to be negotiable and, as a result, may not be appropriately submitted to 
interest arbitration.14 In addition, the record is unclear whether the Village ever 
13
 See, Town of Haverstraw, 9 PERB 1J3063 (1976); PERB's Rules of Procedure, 
§205.6(a) (2). 
14
 See, Newburgh Teachers Assn and Newburgh Enlarged City Sch Dist, 21 PERB 
1J4521 (1988), affd, 21 PERB 1J3036 (1988), confirmed sub nom. Board of Education of 
the Enlarged City School District v PERB, 22 PERB 1J7009 (Sup Ct Albany County 
1989). The issue of vagueness is not before the Board in exceptions or cross-
exceptions. See Rules, §213(b)(4). 
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forwarded to the Association proposed language revisions to the proposal and whether 
those revisions were the subject of negotiations. 
Because of his determination that the Association's proposal had been "off the 
record", the ALJ did not decide whether the Village's proposal was too vague and, if not, 
whether it was a mandatory subject of bargaining Therefore, the matter is also 
remanded to the ALJ for decision, if necessary, on those issues. 
Based on the foregoing, we reverse and remand the case to the ALJ for further 
processing consistent with our decision herein. 
DATED: June 27, 2007 . 
Albany, New York 
Jerome Lefkowilz, Chaimrtan 
tyusJr/^i-. 
Robert Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
CITY OF NEW YORK, 
Employer, 
- and - CASE NO. IA2006-024 
PATROLMEN'S BENEVOLENT ASSOCIATION OF 
THE CITY OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Petitioner. 
PROSKAUER ROSE LLP (M. DAVID ZURNDORFER of counsel), for Employer 
GLEASON, DUNN, WALSH & O'SHEA (RONALD G. DUNN of counsel), for 
Petitioner 
BOARD DECISION AND ORDER 
This case comes to the Board on exceptions filed by the Patrolmen's Benevolent 
Association of the City of New York, Inc. (PBA) to a decision of the Director of 
Conciliation (Director) regarding objections raised by the PBA to the processing of a 
petition for compulsory interest arbitration filed by the City of New York (City). 
We have considered the exceptions on an expedited basis.1 
1
 The PBA requested oral argument; this request was denied by letter dated June 19, 
2007. In their respective briefs, both the PBA and the City refer the Board to the 
content of the Record on Appeal (cited as R ) and the Supplemental Record on 
Appeal (cited as SR ) that were filed with the Appellate Division, Third Department, in 
connection with the City's now withdrawn appeal from the decision and order by Albany 
County Supreme Court in the related case of Hanley and the City of New York v Curreri, 
40 PERB 1J7002 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007). Consistent with the parties' briefs, the 
Board will cite to the Record and Supplemental Record in the same manner in this 
decision. 
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EXCEPTIONS 
In its exceptions, the PBA challenges both the legal authority of the Director as 
well as the historical practices of this agency in processing petitions for compulsory 
interest arbitration pursuant to §209.4 of the Public Employees' Fair Employment Act 
(Act). Specifically, the PBA challenges the decision of the Director on the grounds that: a) 
the Director did not have authority to issue a panel selection list (list) on December 12, 
2006 pursuant to §209.4(c)(ii) of the Act or issue a decision with respect to the PBA's 
objections to the list; b) the Director erred in concluding that the PBA was procedurally 
barred from objecting to the inclusion of two arbitrators on the December 12, 2006 list; 
and c) the two arbitrators included on the list are not "disinterested" as required by 
§209.4(c)(ii) of the Act. The City has filed a response to the PBA's exceptions. 
Based on our review of the record and the Board's consideration of the parties' 
arguments, we modify, and as modified, affirm the decision of the Director. 
FACTS 
The PBA is the exclusive negotiating representative for a unit consisting of over 
23,000 police officers employed by the City. The PBA and the City have engaged in 
negotiations for a collective bargaining agreement to succeed their 2002-2004 collective 
bargaining agreement.2 
On or about July 7, 2006, the City filed with the Director a declaration of impasse 
and the Director appointed a mediator on August 2, 2006.3 Subsequent mediation 
sessions proved unsuccessful. On October 25, 2006, the City filed a petition for interest 
2
 SR 11-38. 
3
 SR 5-70. 
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arbitration;4 the PBA filed its response on November 22, 2006, stating that it did not 
object to the appointment of a tripartite interest arbitration panel under the Act.5 Both the 
petition and response were addressed to PERB's Office of Conciliation. 
On December 4, 2006, the Director received a letter, dated November 30, 2006, 
from the PBA designating its party-appointed arbitrator to the interest arbitration panel.6 
On December 7, 2006, the Director received a letter from the City, dated December 4, 
2006, designating its party-appointed arbitrator.7 
After the parties were unable to mutually agree upon the public member to chair 
the interest arbitration panel, on December 12, 2006, pursuant to §209.4(c)(ii) of the 
Act, the Director sent to both parties a list of nine arbitrators, including arbitrators 
Stanley L. Aiges and Arnold M. Zack, from which the parties were to select the public 
member. At the time that the Director sent the list, the Board was composed of the then 
Chairman and one other member.8 The PBA received the list on December 14 and the 
City received the list on December 15, 2006. 
The Act requires that upon receipt of the list, the parties are to alternately strike 
one of the named arbitrators until one name remains; that person is then designated as 
4
 SR 74-114. 
5
 SR 116-133. 
6SR135. 
7SR137. 
8
 Pursuant to §205.1 of the Act, the Board consists of a total of three members 
appointed by the Governor with the advice and consent of the Senate. Under PERB's 
Rules of Procedure (Rules) §200.1, the board is defined as the Public Employment 
Relations Board, or any two members thereof. 
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the public member. This name striking process is to be completed by the parties within 
) five days of receipt of the list. 
Given that both parties received the list by December 15, 2006, the name striking 
process should have been completed by December 20, 2006. Nevertheless, it is 
undisputed that the parties agreed that they would meet on December 27, 2006, at 3:00 
p.m. to proceed with the striking process.10 This agreement was based on an e-mail 
from the City to the PBA on December 17, 200611 and a subsequent telephone 
conversation between the parties on December 19, 2006.12 
On December 22, 2006, one of the two members of the Board resigned and on 
December 27, 2006, the remaining Board member, Chairman Cuevas, resigned.13 
Prior to December 27, 2006, the parties did not seek permission from the 
Director for an extension of time to complete the striking process. In addition, the parties 
) did not inform the Director of their agreement to extend the statutory and regulatory time 
frame for the name striking process, nor did they inform him of any negotiated 
conditions regarding that agreement. 
9
 Act, §209.4(c)(ii); Rules, §205.7. 
10
 R 6-7. 
11
 SR 201. The e-mail states that the City's counsel was actually engaged on various 
dates and, therefore, proposed December 21 or 22, 2006 for the meeting. The e-mail is 
silent regarding the statutory and regulatory five day period for completion of the striking 
process. 
12
 R18. In its December 28, 2006 letter, the City states that during the December 19, 2006 
conversation, the City expressed a concern that the parties comply with the five day 
period to complete the striking process but that the PBA's counsel insisted that the 
meeting be held on December 27 or 28, 2006 so that his client could be present. SR 206-
208. 
/' 13 From December 28, 2006, the three Board positions remained vacant until the Senate 
confirmed the current Chairman and the Board member on April 18, 2007. 
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The meeting scheduled for December 27, 2006 did not occur. Instead, at the 
request of the parties, a telephone conference call was held with the Director. During 
the conference call, the City informed the Director that the parties had been scheduled 
to meet that day to engage in the striking process but, because the PBA was raising 
objections to the list, the meeting did not take place. The PBA informed the Director that 
it objected to the list on the grounds that: a) the list included arbitrators Aiges and Zack 
who had both issued decisions in prior City-PBA interest arbitrations that the PBA 
viewed as adverse; and b) the Director lacked authority to issue the list in the first 
instance and lacked authority to further process the matter in the absence of a Board. 
At the close of the December 27, 2006 conference call, the Director invited the 
parties to submit written arguments concerning the issues raised in the conference call. 
On December 27, 2006, the PBA faxed a letter to the Director asserting "a limited 
and special appearance," to request that the Director issue a written decision on the 
following issues: a) whether the Director had the power and authority to have issued the 
list without the express approval or direction of the Board; b) whether the Board would 
exclude from the list of proposed arbitrators, those arbitrators who had previously served 
on an interest arbitration panel involving the PBA and the City; c) whether the Director had 
the power and authority to require the PBA to participate in the selection of the public 
member without the express authority or direction of the Board; and d) whether the 
Director has power and authority without the express approval or direction of the Board to 
impose sanctions on a party's refusal or failure to participate in the selection process.14 
SR 203-204. In requesting the written decision from the Director on those issues, the 
PBA did not claim, as it does in its exceptions, that the Director lacked authority to issue 
a decision. 
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On December 28, 2006, the City sent a letter to the Director claiming that the 
PBA failed to participate in the selection process, as required by §205.7 of the Act, by 
failing to comply with the parties' agreement to meet on December 27, 2006 to engage 
in the striking process.15 Based on its allegation, the City requested that "all names on 
the December 12, 2006 list immediately be deemed acceptable to the PBA, so that the 
City can choose the public member" of the panel pursuant to §205.7 of the Rules.16 
In response, the PBA sent a letter to the Director, dated January 2, 2007, 
contesting the City's assertion that the PBA had failed to participate in the striking 
process.17 In addition, the PBA reiterated its objection to the list because two of the 
arbitrators had "issued adverse decisions to the PBA" and that list had not been issued 
by Board or at its express direction.18 
Following receipt of the volley of correspondence, the Director attempted on 
several occasions to have the parties consider alternatives aimed at the harmonious 
selection of the public member of the interest arbitration panel. 
On January 22, 2007, the City sent a letter to the Director stating that it was 
unilaterally designating Zack, one of the arbitrators the PBA objected to, as the public 
member.19 The City's letter reiterated the identical argument it had made in its December 28, 
15
 SR 206-208. 
16SR208. 
17
 SR 157-158. 
18SR158. 
1 9SR161. 
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2006 letter. Three days later, the PBA responded, opposing the City's unilateral selection of 
Zack based on the arguments contained in its earlier letters to the Director.20 
Thereafter, the Director referred the correspondence to PERB's Acting Associate 
Counsel who, on January 26, 2007, sent a letter to the parties requesting additional 
written legal arguments regarding the various issues in dispute as set forth in the 
parties' correspondence to the Director.21 
Prior to responding to the January 26, 2007 letter from PERB's Acting Associate 
Counsel, the City commenced a CPLR Article 78 proceeding in Albany County Supreme 
Court, seeking a judgment to compel the Director to designate Zack as the public 
member on the interest arbitration panel on the grounds that the PBA had allegedly 
failed to participate in the name striking process.22 In response to the City's Article 78 
proceeding against the Director, an answer was filed by the Director and, on February 
16, 2007, the PBA moved to intervene as a party.23 
Following commencement of the City's Article 78 proceeding, on February 14, 
2007, both the City and the PBA responded to the January 26, 2007 letter from PERB's 
Acting Associate Counsel. 24 
On March 17, 2007, Justice Eugene P. Devine issued a decision and order granting 
the PBA's motion to intervene and dismissing the City's Article 78 proceeding.25 Thereafter, 
20
 SR 164-165. 
21
 SR 213-214. 
22
 R 12-47. 
23
 R 49-81, 83-134; SR 174-242. 
24
 SR 222-236. 
25
 40 PERB 1T7002 (Sup Ct Albany County 2007); R5-10. 
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the City filed a notice of appeal, obtained an order from the Appellate Division, Third 
) Department granting leave to file an expedited appeal, and perfected that appeal. On May 
31, 2007, the City withdrew its appeal pending in the Appellate Division, Third Department. 
On May 21, 2007, the Director issued the decision that is the subject of the PBA's 
exceptions. In it, he denied the PBA's challenge to his authority to issue the December 12, 
2006 list of arbitrators or to take any further steps in processing the interest arbitration 
petition without express approval or direction from the Board. In addition, the Director 
rejected the PBA's objection to the inclusion of arbitrators Aiges and Zack on the list, 
concluding that the PBA's objection was untimely and that both arbitrators were 
"disinterested", as that term is utilized in §209.4(c)(ii) of the Act. Furthermore, the Director 
denied the City's contention that the PBA had failed to participate in the selection process as 
required by the Act and Rules and/or that the City's first choice should automatically become 
) the public member and chair of the panel. 
DISCUSSION 
In 1998, the Act was amended to grant PERB jurisdiction to resolve impasses in 
collective negotiations involving the City's police and fire departments through the impasse 
resolution procedures contained in §209.4.26 The expressed legislative purpose for the 
amendment was to enhance the orderly and prompt resolution of collective bargaining 
disputes involving police and fire units thereby enhancing public safety and preventing 
disruptions in essential services.27 The importance of expedited processing of petitions for 
interest arbitration is underscored by the specific statutory time frames set forth in the Act.28 
26
 L 1998, ch 641, §2. 
27
 L 1998, ch 641, §1. See, Patrolmen's Benevolent Assn v City of New York, 97 NY 2d 
) 378(2001). 
28
 See, Town of New Windsor, 31 PERB P061 (1998). 
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Pursuant to §209.4(c) (ii) of the Act29, disputes involving police officers, if not 
resolved in mediation, will be referred, upon the filing of a petition by one or both parties, to 
a tripartite arbitration panel consisting of one member appointed by the public employer, 
one member appointed by the employee organization and one neutral or "public" member 
appointed jointly by the parties or, if they are unable to agree, designated pursuant to an 
alternate striking procedure from a list supplied by the Director. 
On May 30, 2007, the PBA filed its exceptions to the Director's May 21, 2007 
decision.30 The City did not file cross-exceptions to the Director's decision. 
In its exceptions, the PBA challenges the power and authority of the Director to 
issue the December 12, 2006 list of arbitrators, to designate an arbitration panel and to 
issue his May 21, 2007 decision without express authority from the Board. In addition, 
the PBA excepts to the Director's conclusion that the PBA was procedurally barred from 
objecting to the list as well as the Director's finding that arbitrators Aiges and Zack were 
"disinterested" as required by §209.4(c)(ii) of the Act. The PBA's exceptions do not 
challenge the Director's power and authority to process declarations of impasse and 
petitions for interest arbitration or to appoint a mediator, although §§209.2 and 209.3 of 
§209.4(c)(ii) states in relevant part: "the public arbitration panel shall consist of one 
member appointed by the public employer, one member appointed by the employee 
organization and one public member appointed jointly by the public employer and the 
employee organization who shall be selected with ten days after receipt by the board of 
a petition for creation of the arbitration panel... If, within seven days after the mailing 
date, the parties are unable to agree upon the one public member, the board shall 
submit to the parties a list of qualified, disinterested persons for the selection of the 
public member. Each party shall alternately strike from the list one of the names with the 
order of striking determined by lot, until the remaining one person shall be designated 
as public member. This process shall be completed within five days of receipt of this list. 
The parties shall notify the board of the designated public member." 
30
 The PBA has not challenged the Director's decision based on the unfortunate lack of a 
Board quorum for the period December 22, 2006 -Apri l 18, 2007. Therefore, the PBA 
has waived that argument pursuant to §213.2(b)(4) of the Rules. 
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the Act and §§205.1, 205.4, 205.14 of the Rules make reference to the Board 
performing those functions. 
A. THE DIRECTOR'S AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE MAY 21, 2007 DECISION 
We deny the PBA's exception claiming that the Director did not have authority to 
issue his May 21, 2007 written decision. The delegated power and authority of the 
Director to issue decisions involving the dispute resolution provisions of the Act and 
Rules were reiterated by the Board in Board of Education of the City School District of 
the City of New Yor/c.31 In denying the PBA's exception, we note that it was the PBA, on 
December 27, 2006, that had specifically requested the Director to issue a written 
decision on the issues now before us.32 
B. THE DIRECTOR'S AUTHORITY OVER INTEREST ARBITRATION PROCESS 
Similarly, we reject the PBA's exception challenging the Director's authority to 
issue the list and to designate the public arbitration panel. The Act expressly grants to 
the Board the power to establish "panels of qualified persons broadly representative of 
the public to be available to serve as mediators, arbitrators or members of fact-finding 
boards"; "to make such inquiries as it deems necessary for it properly to carry out its 
functions and powers"; to delegate its powers to "any person appointed by the board for 
the performance of its functions"; and to make rules and "to exercise such other powers 
as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes and provisions" of the Act.33 In the 
34 PERB H3016 (2001). 
SR 203-204. 
Act, §§205.5(i), G), (k), and (I). 
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Rules, the Board has empowered the Director to act as "the agent of the board so 
designated,"34 to administer its dispute resolution functions under §209 of the Act.35 
In a series of prior decisions, the Board has confirmed that the Director has been 
delegated the authority to render initial decisions and rulings regarding many different 
aspects of the dispute resolution procedures set forth in the Act. In Town of New 
Windsor,36 we reiterated that delegation and noted that the Director's decisions 
regarding the interest arbitration process were subject to Board review upon exceptions 
despite the absence of such a procedure set forth in the Rules: 
We have for many years reviewed Director determinations involving 
the compulsory interest arbitration provisions of the Act and Rules.... our 
review is not dependent upon the Director granting a party the right to 
appeal the determination which is sought to be reviewed. Our right and 
power to review staff determinations is inherent in our delegation to those 
persons of the power to make them. Moreover, our review is necessary for 
there to be a final order which can be appealed judicially. The absence 
from our Rules of an express procedure for the appeal of Director 
determinations may be an inconvenience to parties, but it is not a bar to 
our review of those determinations, (footnotes omitted)37 
In New York City Transit Authority,38 the Board emphasized that the Director "is 
the head of the Office of Conciliation, an office that provides mediation, fact-finding and 
arbitration services."39 Although that case did not call upon us to reiterate the scope of 
the responsibilities and duties delegated to Director regarding the provision of arbitration 
services, those duties include the preparation and issuance of a list of individuals for an 
34
 Rules, §200.3. 
35
 Act, §§205.4 (a), 205.5 (i), Q), and (k). 
36Supra, note 28. 
37
 Id. at 3133. See also, Russell v PERB, 13 PERB U7015 (Sup Ct Albany County, 1980). 
38
 39 PERB 1J3006 (2006). 
39
 Id. at 3024. 
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interest arbitration panel, the designation of such a panel, as well as issuing decisions 
regarding a party's request to disqualify an arbitrator on a list for not being 
"disinterested." 
For over twenty-five years, the Board has issued decisions reviewing the 
Director's determinations on jurisdictional questions such as whether an impasse in 
negotiations exists,40 substantive issues such as whether a petitioning party is entitled 
to interest arbitration41 and procedural disputes regarding the striking procedure.42 
Despite our prior decisions, including our reiteration of the Board's delegation of 
authority to the Director, the PBA contends that those decisions are all distinguishable 
on the grounds that no other party has ever challenged the Director's authority to 
perform the duties that are challenged in its exceptions.43 In fact, the Director's 
authority and power has not been challenged because it is plainly present. 
Finally, we find no merit to the PBA's effort at parsing our Rules in an attempt to 
support its claim that the Director has not been delegated the power and authority to 
40
 City of New York, 34 PERB 1J3033 (2001); Board ofEduc of the City School Dist of 
the City of New York, 34 PERB p o 16 (2001). 
41
 Niagara Frontier Transportation Auth, 30 PERB H3009 (1997); County of Oneida and 
Oneida County Sheriff, 20 PERB |f3044 (1987); Village of Southampton, 16 PERB 
1J3049 (1983); Yates County and Yates County Sheriffs Assn, 16 PERB |f8001 (1982); 
New York State Parkway PBA, 13 PERB P079 (1980), confirmed sub nom. Russell v 
PERB, 14 PERB 1J7010 (Sup Ct Albany County, 1981). 
42
 Town of New Windsor, supra, note 28. 
43
 Since the 1998 amendment to the Act, after two prior separate rounds of 
negotiations, the PBA filed both declarations of impasse and petitions for interest 
arbitration with the Director. In 2001 and 2004, the PBA defended, before the Board, the 
Director's rulings in processing declarations of impasses and appointing mediators in 
response to exceptions filed in those cases by the City. See, City of New York, 37 
PERB U3018 (2004); City of New York, 34 PERB P033 (2001). Prior to December 27, 
2006, the PBA did not dispute the Director's authority and power with respect to the 
impasse resolution procedures including the power to issue interest arbitration selection 
lists and arbitrator designations. 
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oversee the arbitration panel selection process in interest arbitration cases. As we 
noted in Town of New Windsor,44 the absence of an explicit provision in our Rules does 
not preclude the existence of a particular procedure. Similarly, the language distinctions 
in the Rules cited by the PBA, between interest arbitration and grievance arbitration 
procedures,45 are insufficient to contradict the Board's delegation of authority to the 
Director regarding the panel selection process in interest arbitration. 
Despite the purpose of §209.4 of the Act to insure prompt resolution of 
negotiation impasses, we find that both parties in this case bear responsibility for the 
unnecessary delays in the final selection of the arbitration panel. 
C. PROCEDURAL ISSUE REGARDING OBJECTION TO THE TWO ARBITRATORS 
Both §209.4(c) (ii) of the Act and §205.7 of the Rules mandate that the name 
striking process must be completed "within five days" of receipt of the list. In the present 
case, the City and PBA should have completed the name striking process by December 
20, 2006, because they both received the list from the Director by December 15, 2006. 
Nevertheless, the parties mutually extended the statutory time frame beyond the five 
days. Thus, it was both parties' initial decision to mutually extend the mandatory time 
frame that set the stage for procedural maneuverings by each, resulting in a six-month 
delay in designating the arbitration panel. 
In its second exception, the PBA challenges the Director's determination that the 
PBA waived its right object to Aiges and Zack by failing to object to these arbitrators on 
the list for cause within the five days set forth in the Act and Rules. The parties' 
agreement to extend the striking process was silent regarding the extension of the time 
44
 Supra, note 28. 
45
 Rules, §§205.2(c), 205.7 and 207.7. 
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to object to an arbitrator for cause. Nevertheless, for the reasons set forth below, the 
Board modifies the Director's decision to the extent that he found that the PBA waived 
the right to object to the arbitrators. 
It is well-settled that a party that fails to seek the disqualification of an arbitrator 
based on a known disqualifying relationship will be deemed to have waived the 
objection if it is not raised prior to the arbitration.46 The issue of disqualification of an 
arbitrator must be resolved in the first instance.47 Under §209(4)(c)(ii) of the Act, the 
Legislature granted the Board primary jurisdiction to render final determinations as to 
whether an individual is "qualified" and "disinterested" to serve on the interest arbitration 
panel. By delegation from the Board, the Director has the authority and power to 
establish the list of "qualified, disinterested persons" and to forward that list to the 
parties for the name striking process to be completed within the five day period. 
Although the Rules are silent on the issue, either party can make a factually specific 
objection to the Director, within the name striking period, challenging one or more 
individuals on the list on the grounds that he or she is not disinterested as required by 
the Act.48 Like other substantive and procedural issues, the decision by the Director 
regarding the issue of disqualification is subject to review through objections to the 
Board. 
Based on the fact that a disqualification objection to an individual on a list must 
be made to the Director during the name striking period, we find that the agreement by 
46
 Milliken Woolens, Inc. v Weber Knit Sportswear, Inc., 11 AD2d 166, 168 (1s t Dept 
1960), am 9 NY2d 878, rehearing den, 10 NY2d 750 (1961); City of Albany v PERB, 86 
Misc2d 476 (Sup Ct Albany County 1976). 
47
 JP Stevens and Rytex Corporation, 34 NY2d 123 (1974). 
48
 See, City of Albany v PERB, 86 Misc2d at 478-479. 
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the parties to extend the name striking process until December 27, 2006, also extended 
the time for either party to object to an individual on the list. 
D. DENIAL OF PBA's OBJECTIONS TO ARBITRATORS AIGES AND ZACK 
Therefore, we consider the merits of the PBA's exception that the Director erred in 
failing to disqualify arbitrators Aiges and Zack on the grounds that they are not 
"disinterested" as required by §209. 4(c)(ii) of the Act.49 In 1974, when the Legislature 
amended the Act to include interest arbitration, it did not define the term "disinterested."50 
Nonetheless, for over a century, the term "disinterested" has been interpreted by New 
York case law as requiring an arbitrator to have both a lack of a pecuniary interest in the 
outcome and a lack of bias or prejudice.51 
Following a review of the record, the Board concludes that the PBA's 
disqualification objection to arbitrators Aiges and Zack is without merit. The fact that 
both arbitrators may have served on a previous interest arbitration panel with respect to 
the parties does not demonstrate that they have an interest in the outcome or are 
biased and prejudiced. In Buffalo Police Benevolent Association v City of Buffalo,52 an 
interest arbitration panel was found to be disinterested under the Act and, therefore, 
able to rehear and determine a dispute even after the panel's initial award was vacated. 
49
 The PBA does not dispute that both arbitrators are qualified under the Act to be a 
neutral member of an interest arbitration panel. 
50
 L 1974, ch 724, §3; L 1974, ch 725, §3. 
51
 Bradshaw v Agricultural Insurance Company of Watertown, NY, 137 NY 137 (1893); 
See also, Black's Law Dictionary, Sixth Edition, definition of "disinterested": Not 
concerned, in respect to possible gain or loss, in the result of the pending proceedings 
or transactions. Not having any interest in matter referred to or in controversy; free from 
prejudice or partiality; impartial or fair minded; without pecuniary interest; not previously 
interested; not biased or prejudiced" Citations omitted. 
82 AD2d 635 (4tn Dept 1981). 
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Even a gratuitous comment in a prior arbitration decision and award regarding police 
officers employed by another employer is insufficient to establish that an arbitrator is not 
"disinterested" under the Act to hear a subsequent interest arbitration.53 Consequently, 
we conclude that the PBA did not waive its right to object to arbitrators Aiges and Zack. 
Finally, we find no merit to the PBA's claim that Zack is not disinterested under the 
Act because of a purported financial dispute he may have with the Cornell University 
School of Industrial and Labor Relations (ILR) where the PBA's potential witnesses may 
be the ILR's current dean and an ILR professor.54 The PBA has failed to meet its burden 
of demonstrating with affidavits the specific nature of this collateral dispute between 
arbitrator Zack and ILR and establishing a causal connection that demonstrates the 
dispute to be sufficient to establish bias or prejudice warranting disqualification. 
E. REMAINING PBA EXCEPTIONS DENIED 
The Board has considered the remaining arguments by the PBA and has found 
them to be without merit. 
Based on the foregoing, we modify the decision of the Director and, as modified, 
affirm and remand the matter to the Director for further processing consistent with our 
decision herein. 
IT IS, THEREFORE, ORDERED that within five days of receipt of this decision, 
the City and the PBA, shall complete the name striking process with respect to the 
December 12, 2006 list. Any further delays, on consent or otherwise, by either party will 
5J
 City of Albany v PERB, 86 Misc2d at 479-480. 
54
 The PBA's first reference to the alleged dispute was relegated to a footnote in a letter 
submitted almost two months after the PBA's original objection to Zack. SR 226. The fact 
that the PBA repeated the conclusory allegation in it's sworn pleading in Hartley and the 
City of New York v Curreri, supra, does not enhance its probative value. SR 182. 
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be deemed as an unwillingness to participate in the selection process and the Director 
shall have authority to select the neutral arbitrator for the panel without further 
consultation with either party pursuant to Rule, §205.7(b). 
DATED: June 27, 2007 
Albany, New York 
iAcryyu^ A / , 
Jerome Lefkpwitz, CbgrTfman 
,/w^/y^^ 
Robert S. Hite, Member 
STATE OF NEW YORK 
PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT RELATIONS BOARD 
In the Matter of 
NORTH SALEM SCHOOL-RELATED PROFESSIONALS, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO, 
Petitioner, 
-and- CASE NO. C-5694 
NORTH SALEM CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT, 
Employer. 
CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVE AND ORDER TO NEGOTIATE 
A representation proceeding having been conducted in the above matter by the 
Public Employment Relations Board in accordance with the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act and the Rules of Procedure of the Board, and it appearing that a 
negotiating representative has been selected, 
Pursuant to the authority vested in the Board by the Public Employees' Fair 
Employment Act, 
IT IS HEREBY CERTIFIED that the North Salem School-Related Professionals, 
NYSUT, AFT, AFL-CIO has been designated and selected by a majority of the 
employees of the above-named public employer, in the unit agreed upon by the parties 
and described below, as their exclusive representative for the purpose of collective 
negotiations and the settlement of grievances. 
Certification - C-5694 - 2 -
Included: Custodial employees, Transportation employees, Maintenance 
employees and Mechanics. 
Excluded: All others. 
FURTHER, IT IS ORDERED that the above named public employer shall 
negotiate collectively with the North Salem School-Related Professionals, NYSUT, AFT, 
AFL-CIO. The duty to negotiate collectively includes the mutual obligation to meet at 
reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and other 
terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any 
question arising thereunder, and the execution of a written agreement incorporating any 
agreement reached if requested by either party. Such obligation does not compel 
either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession. 
DATED: June 27, 2007 
Albany, New York 
•jjyury^^ J—^4J^C^A^" 
7 Jerome LejRowitz, Chairman 
7
" R o b e r t ' s . Hite, Member 
